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Abstract 
 
Naturally monopolistic network industries are subject to regulation of access to market 
and charging in order to achieve optimal use of infrastructure and avoid the abuse of 
monopoly power. Relatively little is known what results does such regulation genrerate 
and whether it achieves objectives. Literature states that due to the context-specific nature 
of regulatory framework, ex post analysis and practical experiments are necessary to 
study the impact of economic regulation. In this paper, the authors provide analysis of 
the results of economic regulation of railway infrastructure management in Estonia. 
Regulatory objectives and targets from relevant policy sources are identified and 
indicators compiled to monitor results. This is followed by discussion and 
recommendations for further research.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the years, a vast amount of academic work has been done on the merits and 
shortcomings of regulation as a public policy tool. The theoretical discussion can be 
broadly divided into public-interest and private-interest categories. Public-interest 
approach bases its argument on the value-adding benevolent regulator that corrects 
market failure and, by doing that, improves social welfare. Private-interest theories 
disagree with the assumption of effective regulatory response due to numerous 
behavioural and informational flaws that benefit different interest-groups, and make it 
inefficient or impossible to achieve socially optimal outcome of a regulatory process. 
There is an ample of critique on both concepts, primarily relating to lack of ability to 
empirically test respective arguments. However, differences on the rationales and 
assumptions aside, there seems to be a widespread agreement in mainstream economic 
literature that the absence of a competitive market mechanism warrants certain level of 
regulatory intervention.  
 
It is well established concept that a company with monopoly power tends to produce less 
and charge a higher price than socially optimal. Therefore, exploitation of monopolistic 
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 dominance leads to welfare loss for a society.  A government has a range of regulatory 
tools to tackle the monopolistic market structure and support effective competition in the 
industry. There are, however, certain industries where it would be impossible or feasible 
to enforce competition. Such industries, for example network utilities, are referred to as 
naturally monopolistic industries. Under the circumstances, economic regulation of 
market access and charging is imposed to reduce monopolistic behaviour and compensate 
for the absence of competition.   
 
Economic regulation is complex and inherently costly, therefore, the results should be 
assessed with appropriate scrutiny, including whether they deliver the objectives of the 
regulation. Despite a wide range and long history of monopoly regulation in the 
developed countries, the number of empirical studies available is limited. Likewise, there 
are only few analysis that are relevant in Estonia’s context.  For example, Eerma (2013) 
focuses on institutional setups and sector specific regulation in certain industries in 
Estonia. Uukkivi et al (2014) provide an in-depth discussion on the institutional 
framework of five regulated network utility sectors (electricity, railways, water and 
sewage, gas, district heating) in Estonia, whereas Ots (2016) offers a commentary on 
price regulation practices in Estonian energy sector from the regulator’s perspective.  
 
In order to contribute to the discourse, the  objective of this paper is to assess economic 
regulation of a utility sector in Estonia and to propose indicators to monitor the results of 
the regulation. The analysis builds on the framework established in Uukkivi et al (2014) 
and focuses on railway infrastructure sector as a case study. Railway infrastucture was 
chosen because the regulatory framework of railways in Europe is relatively standardised 
on the level of directives. Railway legislation, technical standard and the scope of the 
network in Estonia has not changed materially over the years and the number of regulated 
companies is small which reduces complexity.  
 
Estonia as a country provides interesting context. It started its transformation towards 
market economy immediately after regaining independence in 1990 with a major 
overhaul of the former Soviet governance structures. The process was marked by very 
liberal economic policy, including extensive privatization of the state’s assets in a short 
timeframe. Strategic infrastructure and utility companies were restructured within a 
decade and, in many instances, were privately owned. All those developments coincided 
with the country’s accession to the European Union and harmonisation of domestic 
legislation with the acquis communautaire as well as with the European Union’s own 
market liberalisation policies in a number of utility sectors. Due to these developments, 
Estonia was often among the early adopters of European Union’s policies for market 
liberalisation and developed economic regulation in all network utility sectors with a 
wide range of regulatory interaction. 
 
The approach of this paper is as follows. First, it discusses theoretical literature on 
economic regulation of natural monopolies and regulatory impact assessment. Secondly, 
the authors provide summary of the institutional setup and objectives of economic 
regulation of railway infrastructure management in Estonia. Finally, author’s identify 
relevant policy objectives and establish corresponding indicators to monitor results of 
regulation.  
 2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Discussion on economic regulation of a natural monopoly 
 
The term regulation has been used loosely in academic literature and different 
taxonomies of the concept are proposed. This paper refers to regulation as a system of 
publicly mandated institutions and legally enforceable rules all operators in a sector are 
subject to. Therefore, the regulation covers both legislative domain (setting of the rules) 
and executive domain (enforcement of the rules) but does not include codes of conduct 
or other voluntary sector specific arrangements. The authors of this paper also subscribe 
to the widely used distinction between social and economic regulation (Viscusi, Vernon 
and Harrington 2005; Ogus 2004). Economic regulation is closely related to the concept 
of natural monopoly and adresses market access and charging in such industries ex ante. 
It should not be confused with competition or antitrust regulation that monitors market 
performance ex post. 
 
The concept of competition is one of the important topics in academic debate of economic 
regulation. It is commonly assumed that the process of rivalry between informed and 
rational parties leads to the optimal efficiency of resources in terms of productivity and 
allocation. The perception of how competition affects market behaviours has evolved 
over time. Neoclassical approach to static market equilibriums required perfect 
competition i.e. a marketplace with perfectly informed buyers and sellers of homogenous 
products with perfectly free entry. Obiously such conditions do not exist in actual markets 
and an entirely satisfactory competitive standard – effective competition – has become a 
substitute to the pure theorist’s textbook idea of perfect competition (Shepherd 1990: 
305-306). Effective competition, however, has greater importance beyond productive and 
allocative efficiency. Kimmelmann and Cooper, for example, consider effective 
competition essential for good market performance, a cornerstone of fundamental values 
such as freedom of opportunity and proper function of democracy in a society 
(Kimmelmann and Cooper 2015: 406).  
 
In some markets, effective competition is either absent or dysfunctional and needs to be 
supported through regulation or other alternatives. A market situation which particluarly 
requires for such public policy intervention is called „natural monopoly“. According to 
the mainstream approach on natural monopolies, an industry is considered naturally 
monopolistic when its cost function is characterized by declining average costs per single 
output and cost subadditivity across multiple outputs. In order to deter market entry, 
economies of scale must also be associated with sunk costs. (Baumol 1977: 809, Baumol 
et al 1977: 352) Therefore, a naturally monopolistic industry presents both economies of 
scale and economies of co-production. Under such circumstances, the most efficient 
arrangement for a society is to have such market served by a single firm i.e.  a monopoly 
is maintained but an appropriate framework is set up to to challenge monopolistic 
behaviour. 
Unlike a „standard“ monopoly, naturally monopolistic industry is defined by the 
production technology and not the number of companies in the market. It is the capital 
intensity and sunk costs of investment that create natural barriers to entry to such 
 industries. Moreover, regulatory barriers are often in place due to considerations for 
achieving better allocative and productive efficiency.  
 
Mosca provides an excellent summary of academic discourse on natural monopolies. 
According to that, natural monopolies typically occur in two types of productions. The 
first is described by the need for a large infrastructure, such as transport networks and 
some public utilities. The second type of natural monopoly can be explained by the 
presence of network effects. (Mosca 2008: 324) Liebowitz and Margolis explain that 
positive network effects are very similar to conventional firm-level economies of scale. 
If larger networks have idefinitely increasing advantage over smaller networks then we 
have entered the realm of natural monopoly. (Liebowitz and Margolis1998: 672)  
 
In general, network utilities like transmission and distribution of electricity and gas, 
disctrict heating, water and sewage, railway infrastructure etc. are commonly considered 
in academic literature as examples of natural monopolies. Moreover, some authors argue 
that such utilities are natural monopolies also due to essential importance to the 
functioning of society and influence they have on other economic sectors (Hertog 2010: 
2) or due to the complexity of their operations (Cogman 2001: 2). 
 
Regulation is foremost a political act (Braeutigam, 1989: 1299), thus the evolution of 
economic regulation of naturally monopolistic industries has been ambivalent. 
Governments used to provide utility services through own apparatus in order to achieve 
economies of scale and cross-subsidize between customer segments. There have been 
several shifts of deregulation and reregulation among the European Union and the OECD 
countries that have changed the institutional structure and the way industries operate. 
Pera explains that deregulation and privatization started in the end of 1970s by 
governments seeking more reliance on market forces and competition. In the United 
States, many industries with economic regulation (especially transport, energy, 
telecommunications) saw complexity of rules abolished and regulatory burden on 
companies reduced. In Europe, deregulation was accompanied with privatization of 
public enterprises. The reforms were focused on achieving more efficient charging 
mechanism,  introduction of market based stimulae, and search for better ways of 
managing natural monopolies. (Pera 1989: 160, 165) Detailed overview of how policy 
intitiatives on restraining trade unions, reducing state subsidies, supporting innovation 
and efficiency etc. reformed economic regulation landscape in the United States and 
Europe is provided by Hahn (1990), Kahn (1990), Newberry (2000) and Winston (1998). 
Today, economic regulation of network utilities is a common approach among the 
European Union and the OECD countries. 
 
Economic regulation is a complicated interaction between stakeholders who have varying 
and sometimes conflicting interests. A regulated network utility strives to maximize 
profit in the short term whereas consumers demand high quality for low prices. Also 
regulators and politicians have their own agendas that are not always aligned. Leaver 
describes how regulators want to avoid public criticisms which occasionaly leads them 
to behave inefficiently in the price reviews (Leaver 2009: 573). Lim and Yurukoglu note 
the time-inconcistency problem as regulators promise a fair return on investments ex 
ante, but have no motivation to keep the promise after substantial investments have been 
 made (Lim and Yurukoglu 2018: 2). As a result, changing political realities can 
systematically affect decisions that regulators make and influence productive and 
allocative efficiency in an industry.  
 
Regulating an industry sets incentives and disincentives to companies affecting their 
behaviour. Rational actors will anticipate regulatory developments and adapt their 
decisions and activities accordingly (Kydland and Presscott 1977, Gilbert and Newberry 
1994). For example, price regulation methodology, level of scrutiny that a regulator 
imposes on costs, or the rate of return it allows on investment will have effect on cost of 
capital of utilities, incentive to invest in new technologies etc.  
 
Maintaining a regulatory framework incurs substantial costs for the society. A regulated 
company has to contribute time and resources, adjust internal structures and comply with 
operational and informational requirements. As the company tries to capitalize on the 
information assymetry it has over costs and technology, a regulator has to develop a 
corresponding approach of monitoring and enforcing compliance. Review of cost 
structures and determining rate levels is a time-consuming process that requires many 
resources. 
 
2.2 Objectives of regulation and assessment of regulatory outcomes 
 
The fact that a regulation seeks to change behaviour and entails a complex system of 
interactions makes it nearly impossible to foresee the impact of implementing a 
regulation ex ante. Therefore, assessment of policies ex post is particularly important to 
undestand what works and whether the objectives of regulation are met or not. Real 
reform of regulation requires promoting a culture of regulatory evaluation and 
experiments  (Greenstone 2009: 123). The popular concept of „policy cycle“ that 
illustrates policy making in different phases is appropriate to explain this. Howlett, for 
example, divides policy cycle into five steps: setting agenda, formulating policy, decision 
making, implementing policy and assessing policy (Howlett et al 1995:12). Assessment 
as the last phase in policy making aims to establish how a policy has performed in terms 
of reducing the problem.  
 
The European Union and the OECD have been promoting assessments of regulations and 
published several guidelines on best practices. Yet establishing such feedback loops is 
complicated and poses a challenge for many reasons. First, the difference between 
monitoring policy implementation and evaluation of policy impact should be noted. 
Monitoring relates to identification of what results a policy delivers whereas evaluation 
determines whether the policy is relevant, effective and efficient (Segone et al 2008: 7-
8). Second, a number of varying taxonomies are proposed for analysis of policy impact 
in theoretical literature. The following figure (Figure 1) refers to the approach proposed 
by Coglianese (2012).  
  
Figure 1. Causal map of regulation and its effects  
Source: Authors’ modification from Coglianese 2012: 21 
 
Coglianese divides regulatory interaction into three core categories: regulation, 
behaviours and outcomes. The exercise of evaluation can be applied in the same manner 
across all categories: evaluation of how well a regulation is administered (activity); 
evaluation of compliance (behavior), and evaluation of outcomes. Outcome-based 
studies can additionally be differentiated based on the core features of outcome 
evaluation: a. indicators as empirical measures of outcomes and b. assessment of the 
extent to which the regulation has caused any of the observed changes in indicators 
(outcomes). To say that a regulation is effective is to attribute it to positive changes in 
indicators. (Coglianese 2012: 14-15)  
 
A set of indicators is a tool for identifying the outcomes of regulation. Eurostat guidelines 
describe indicators as „road signs“ of policy making that help to understand complex 
realities, assess where processes are heading and if goals are to be reached. These are 
measures that condense relevant information on policy to facilitate assessment. (Eurostat 
2017: 9-10) Indicators should provide „evidence“ that is expected to support conclusion 
(Oxman et al 2009: 3). Lomas also stresses the context-sensitive rather than scientific 
nature of evidence in social sciences. This means that any evidence has little meaning 
unless adapted to the circumstances of its application. (Lomas et al 2005: 4) 
 
It is crucial to select appropriate set of indicators that are relevant to the regulatory matter 
and for which observable data is available. Coglianese puts that any selection of 
indicators must always be based on the purpose of the evaluation. When conducting 
evaluation, the selection of indicators will depend on regulatory objectives because 
defining something as a problem cannot be accomplished without reference to value 
choices. Because of this very reason, the evaluation of a specific regulation should be 
 guided by the concerns or objectives of policy makers setting up that regulation. In the 
absence of a specific problem, the discussion of indicators for regulatory evaluation will 
be abstract. (Coglianese 2012: 17-20) Any assessment of a regulation should first identify 
the potential users of performance measures and then tailor those measures according to 
the users needs (Metzenbaum 1998: 53).  
 
The context-specific nature of regulatory outcomes and indicators leads to a question 
whether particular objectives of economic regulation of network utilities could be 
formulated that apply in every context? Theory holds that economic regulation of a 
monopoly aims to contain monopolistic market failure and achieve the resource 
allocation and production efficiency similar to effective competitive market. Obviously 
more specific objectives will vary, however, since network industries are strategically 
important and support other economic sectors and society as a whole, operational 
sustainability of a regulated company is somewhat a universal goal that every regulation 
should consider. If the company is not able to function, there is no service to the 
consumers.  
 
It is obvious that economic regulation is redistributive by nature and a range of trade-offs 
(in the form of financial, political, social, economical gains, pressures and constraints) 
take place between different interest-groups. Therefore, more specific goals and 
indicators for regulatory performance are likely to differ country by country. Investors 
seek to maximize profits, whereas consumers have obvious interersts in security of 
supply, quality of service and lower prices. Yet consumers are not homogenous and 
sometimes their interests contradict as some groups are cross-subsidized by others. 
Yarrow argues that certain objectives of regulation can relate to specific problems of an 
industry and change over time. For example, regulation may be initiated due to 
suboptimal efficiency and performance of a company when taxpayers or customers bear 
the burden of excessive costs.  (Yarrow 2008: 6-7). Eventually, it is the regulator that 
must strike a right balance between the interests of customers and a company. After all, 
the conflict of objectives is a pervasive feature of policy debates (Helm 2006: 171), 
whereas both policy and politics affect regulation and change outcomes in the economy 
(Kimmelmann and Cooper 2015: 404). 
 
3. Analysis of economic regulation of railways in Estonia 
 
3.1 Institutions and legislation of railway sector in Estonia 
 
In the following chapter, the authors of this paper assess the results of economic 
regulation with the sectoral case study of railway infrastructure management in Estonia. 
The regulatory framework for railway infrastructure management in question was 
established in Estonia in 2004 and has produced a reasonable volume of regulatory 
interaction inherent the analysis and this study. First, summary is provided on 
institutional design of relevant state institutions, regulated companies and main 
provisions from Estonian railway legislation. Comprehensive outline on the evolution of 
economic regulation and respective institutions in railway sector in Estonia is available 
in Uukkivi et al (2014). Then, country specific regulatory objectives in railway sector are 
 identified from relevant legislation and other policy sources, and finally, appropriate 
indicators are proposed based on the objectives to assess impact of regulation.   
 
Railway infrastructure management in Europe has traditionally been organised by state-
owned or state controlled entities. Decades of monopolism without any threat of 
competition resulted in very low levels of productive and allocative efficiency of railway 
management, and accumulated huge deficits funded by the public budget. This proved 
the main impetus for sequential initiatives of economic regulation of railways in Europe. 
In order to increase the commercial viability of railway transport and promote modal shift 
from roads to railway, policies of the European Union have resulted in a gradual 
separation of the state administration and railway business, as well as vertical 
disintegration of monopolistic and inherently competitive railway operations. Although 
most of the railway network in Europe is still controlled by the former infrastructure 
monopolies, provision and charging of railway infrastructure management  services in 
the European Union is more regulated than any other utility sector. Vertical unbundling 
is the central structural measure that allows for efficient use of existing railway 
infrastructure by providing access to it to all railway traffic operators for a fee payable to 
infrastructure manager.  
 
European Union railway directives are an important source of regulation that Estonia 
must adhere to, principles and provisions laid down in Estonian railway act fully comply 
with the European Union railway policy. Estonian railway legislation considers main 
railway network as a natural monopoly and imposes restrictions on the property rights of 
public railway infrastructure in order to restrain monopolistic practices on access to the 
infrastructure and charging. After the adoption of European Union railway directives and 
opening up railway traffic operations to competition, Estonia required to vertically 
separate provision of railway transport services from infrastructure management. 
 
There are two infrastructure managers of public railway network in Estonia: Eesti 
Raudtee AS (Estonian Railways) and Edelaraudtee Infrastruktuuri AS (South-West 
Railways Infrastructure). Both companies operate railway network that has been 
nominated as public interest by law and are therefore subject to economic regulation of 
access to the network and charging. Whilst Eesti Raudtee is 100% owned by the state 
Edelaraudtee is owned by private investors. Eesti Raudtee and Edelaraudtee had affiliated 
entities operating railway traffic, therefore, functions of capacity allocation and setting 
of infrastructure fee have been transferred to the independent body, Estonian Technical 
Regulatory Authority. Due to that fact, Estonian Competition Board acts as the National 
Regulatory Authority as stipulated in the European Union directives. Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications of Estonia (MoEAC) is responsible for setting 
railway policy and making infrastructure financing agreements with railway 
infrastructure managers.  
The price that a railway infrastructure manager can charge from railway transport 
companies to fund its infrastructure is regulated in detail by a specific section of the 
legislation, railway infrastructure charging methodology. It is rate-of-return type of 
approach and it has been in place almost unchanged with limited number of minor 
modifications since 2004. In principle, the methodology regulates the level of costs 
(operating, overheads, depreciation) that can be passed on to customers and a return that 
 a railway infrastructure manager can earn from its fixed assets. Methodological approach 
to railway infrastructure charging is similar to that of other network utility sectors in 
Estonia but the application of fee period is different. Estonian Technical Regulatory 
Authority is obliged to set an annual fee for railway infrastructure and renew it every 
year, whereas Estonian Competition Board sets fees that do not have a defined term. 
Those are valid until the new fee is set. 
 
3.2 Regulatory objectives of economic regulation of railways 
 
Ex post assessment of regulation requires to identify objectives i.e. the problem what the 
regulation should solve. After that, appropriate set of indicators should be chosen to 
monitor the outcomes of regulation. There are a number of sources in public policy that 
have the legitimacy to define and set such objectives: legislation, policy strategies, 
declarations by politicans or authorities responsible for particular domain (ministry, 
regulator). In order to identify regulatory objectives of railway regulation in Estonia, the 
authors of this paper analysed Estonian railway acts and railway infrastructure charging 
methodologies, National Transport Development Plan 2014-2020, fee decisions of 
Estonian Technical Regulatory Authority and infrastructure financing agreements 
between the MoEAC and railway infrastructure manager. 
 
Railway act defines overall operational and financial objectives for railway infrastructure 
management. Those objectives are (a) provide railway transport operators non-
discriminatory access to public railway infrastructure with regard to services, charges etc. 
(§ 7 pt 1), (b) ensure operational safety of the railway network, (c) keep the network 
operational for railway traffic to use (§ 34 pt 1), and (d) maintain the financial stability 
of a railway infrastructure manager by balancing revenues and costs at least over the five-
year period (§ 492 pt 5). It is noted that the act does not provide any specific targets. 
 
Railway infrastructure charging methodology outlines detailed technical procedure 
around the calculation of railway infrastructure fee. The methodology scrutinises the 
allocation of costs and assets between services, elimination of waste etc, however, it does 
not set any specific targets to the company or regulator to meet. The authors of this paper 
studied regulatory decisions of the Estonian Railway Administration, the Estonian 
Railway Inspectorate and the Estonian Technical Regulatory Authority relating to the 
process of setting infrastructure charge based on the charging methodology since 2004. 
There is a distinctive pattern in the explanatory notes alluding that the regulator insists 
on strong cost discipline, however, no firm targets have been established for the regulated 
company to achieve.  
 
National Transport Development Plan 2014–2020 outlines a number of declarations that 
can be considered objectives of the economic regulation of railway infrastructure 
management. It declares that railway freight transport cannot absorb the current level of 
railway infrastructure fees and they need to become more competitive, also the financial 
viability of Eesti Raudtee is under pressure. Railway passenger operations need to 
increase speeds up to 120 km/h and exceed road transport alternatives. Infrastructure 
investments should be directed to maintaining network capacity, safety and quality of 
operations. (National Transport Development Plan 2013: 53)  
  
Infrastructure financing contracts have only been established between the MoEAC and 
Eesti Raudtee. The contracts in such format with the railway infrastructure manager were 
put in place in 2016 and renewed annually, they aim to balance the expenditure and 
revenue of railway infrastructure management under „normal business conditions“ over 
the five-year period. Importantly, the conctracts define clear areas of priority and 
establish targets. Contract pt 1.4.1 outlines these priorities as: 
 operating speed of railway line, reliability of service and consumer satisfaction; 
 capacity of the railway network; 
 asset management; 
 volume of operations; 
 safety performance; 
 environmental protection. 
 
Annex of the contract identifies annual targets and is renewed every year. Comprehensive 
summary of regulatory objectives of railway infrastructure management is presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Regulatory objectives of railway infrastructure management in Estonia 
Source Objective Target 
Railway act 1. Non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure 
2. Railway safety 
3. Service provision reliability 
4. Financial stability  
1. None  
2. None 
3. None 
4. Balanced revenues 
and costs over 5 year 
periods 
National 
Transport 
Development 
Plan 2014-2020 
1. Competitive fee level for freight 
transport 
2. Increase of passenger traffic 
service speeds  
3. Safety performance, capacity and 
quality  
1. Fee level should not 
increase 
2. 120 km/h and exceed 
road alternatives 
3. Current level should 
be maintained 
Infrastructure 
charging 
methodology 
1. Correct application of 
methodology and cost discipline 
1. None 
Infrastructure 
financing 
contract 
1. Operational speeds on the network 
2. Service provision capability 
3. Network capacity 
4. Asset management/cost discipline 
5. Safety 
6. Declares no objectives for 
customer satisfaction, volume of 
operations and environmental 
safety 
1. Yes. Detailed  
2. Yes. Number of 
breakdowns 
3. Yes. Detailed 
4. Yes.  
5. Yes. Number of 
level-crossings to be 
upgraded 
6. N/A 
Fee decisions 1. Cost discipline 1. None 
Source: authors’ compilation 
 
 3.3 Discussion of regulatory outcomes of economic regulation of railways  
 
3.3.1 Regulatory indicators 
 
Previous section of this paper identified regulatory objectives of economic regulation of 
railway infrastructure management in Estonia. In order to collate evidence on whether 
those objectives have been met and what the outcomes are, a set of indicators needs to be 
compiled. The following discussion focuses only on Eesti Raudtee and scopes out 
Edelaraudtee. This is because the latter is solely used for passenger transport funded from 
public service obligation (PSO) contracts, also, the state has not signed an infrastructure 
financing contract with Edelaraudtee. Eesti Raudtee presents a wider mix of freight and 
passenger traffic and also has the status of „railway administration“ with regard to the 
non-EU countries.  
 
Stenström proposes a system for performance measurement of railway infrastructure 
management that differentiates between two groups of indicators: managerial group and 
condition group. Managerial group constist of technical indicators, organisational 
indicators, economic indicators and HSE (health, safety and environment) indicators, 
whereas condition group displays the status of different technical subsystems of railway 
infrastructure. (Stenström et al. 2012: 6-8) Current analysis focuses on managerial 
indicators as those are relevant for the purpose of monitoring regulatory outcomes. When 
defining regulatory objectives, policy makers and regulators usually focus on high level 
overall performance of a regulated company as opposed to detailed technical 
characteristics of infrastructure. Moreover, if infrastructure technical systems fail then 
performance levels are also affected. One can thus argue that condition level aspects are 
included in the managerial indicators.  
 
Indicators for economic regulation of railway infrastructure management in Estonia are 
presented in Table 2. Indicators and targets for specific infrastructure management 
domains were sourced from infrastructure financing contracts or other sources of 
regulatory objectives. In the absence of predefined indicators, the authors propose them 
provided that relevant data is available. The analysis of this paper covers the period from 
2013 onwards when the business concern structure of Eesti Raudtee was abolished and 
vertical separation between railway infrastructure management and railway transport 
operations was finalised. It should be mentioned, however, that the state has set clear 
targets for railway infrastructure manager only for the last two years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Regulatory indicators of railway infrastructure management on Eesti Raudtee 
infrastructure 2013-2017 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
actual actual actual target actual target actual 
Network speed 
(km/share with 
120 km/h) 
500 
(74%) 
529 
(78%) 
529 
(78%) 
541 
(80%) 
556 
(82%) 
556 
(82%) 
571 
(84%) 
Network 
capacity (train 
pairs/day)3 
160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Number of 
breakdowns 
405 418 258 320 257 320 258 
Total 
expenditure 
(million EUR) 
55,08 54,43 54,13 less 
than 
53,914 
53,43 less 
than 
56,115 
53,04 
Volume of 
operations 
(million train-
km; million 
freight tonnes) 
5, 97  
(24,4) 
6, 45 
(19,3) 
5, 94 
(15,4) 
N/A 5, 71 
(12,5) 
N/A 5, 66 
(12,4) 
Work safety 
(number of 
incidents; 
working days 
lost)  
1 
(24) 
5 (224) 1 
(0) 
N/A 3 
(35) 
N/A 4    
(91) 
Source: authors’ analysis 
 
3.3.2 Technical and organisational indicators 
 
Technical and organisational indicators are related to reliability, availability and 
maintainability of railway infrastructure management (Stenström et al. 2012: 6-7). With 
reference to the regulatory objectives of railways in Estonia, service provision reliability 
and operational speed on railway network fall into this category.  
 
Proportion of railway main lines with maximum operational speed (120 km/h) is a proxy 
indicator of the technical condition of railway because maintenance deficiencies usually 
translate to speed restrictions. One can note that targets and levels of the indicator have 
steadily increased over the past five years. The second indicator measures the flexibility 
of railway capacity. Level of capacity demanded by the state and respectively provided 
                                                          
3 Railway capacity is calculated for each individual line. The  table indicates maximum capacity of 
Tapa-Lagedi-Ülemiste which is the most heavily used railway segment in Estonia. The actual 
capacity allocated on the mentioned segment for 2017/2018 traffic period is 38 train pairs/day (Eesti 
Raudtee web-site). 
4 Less than CPI–0,5% from previous year 
5 Less than 5% increase from previous year 
 by railway infrastructure manager has remained flat. Railway capacity on Eesti Raudtee, 
however, is abundant as available capacity on the most heavily used main line exceeds 
actual utilization by a factor of four. Number of breakdowns affecting train schedule is 
the third indicator in this segment. Overall, the number of breakdowns has been falling 
and targets for the last two years have been achieved by the infrastructure manager. The 
state does not set objectives on customer satisfaction about the infrastructure service and 
respective indicators cannot be defined in this paper due to the lack of relevant data.  
 
3.3.3 Economic indicators 
 
Economic indicators address cost-efficiency and financial viability of railway 
infrastructure management. Although all policy sources of railway regulation in Estonia 
stress the need for cost discipline and financial stability of the regulated company, total 
expenditure6 of railway infrastructure management is the only indicator defined in 
infrastructure financing contracts. Total expenditure levels of Eesti Raudtee have been 
falling moderately over years in nominal terms, but set targets are not challenging 
considering the objectives and allow for up to 5% annual increase. The state has not set 
objectives or targets on the volume of operations on the railway infrastructure. The 
authors therefore provide an indicator based on train-kilometers and total freight volume 
which is considered an appropriate metric reflecting both the intensity of passenger and 
freight traffic. One can note that while freight volume has more than halved over the past 
five years, the amount of train-kilometres has decreased marginally. Therefore, passenger 
traffic has substituted freight in this metric. Also, cost efficiency of infrastructure 
management relative to the volume of railway traffic has somewhat deteriorated. Due to 
the fact that railway infrastructure manager’s total budget is set by the regulator, variation 
between the forecasted and actual expenditure could also be considered as regulatory 
indicator in future. 
 
3.3.4 Health, safety and environment (HSE) indicators  
 
HSE indicators are an important perspective to railway infrastructure management as 
poor record in this domain can have serious implications to reliability of supply and 
performance. For that reason, general HSE requirements are usually set on the level of 
legislation. All sources of regulatory objectives of railway infrastructure management in 
Estonia state the importance of HSE but only infrastructure financing contract sets clear 
targets. In the contract, the MoEAC and Eesti Raudtee agree on the number of level 
crossings and pedestrian crossings to be upgraded every year.  While Eesti Raudtee has 
achieved targets 2016 and 2017, it is difficult to estimate the impact such investments 
have on safety. In principle, accidents on railway level crossings are caused by the breach 
of traffic code by road traffic or pedestrians. Therefore, improvement of safety on level 
crossings depends on a variety of technical, social and behavioural aspects well beyond 
the domain of railway infrastructure management. The state has not set regulatory 
objectives on occupational safety thus the authors provide an aggregate indicator on the 
number of incidents and working days lost because occupational safety is a domain where 
                                                          
6 Total expenditure consist of operating expenditure and capital expenditure. Reasonable business 
profit is not included. 
 the regulated company can directly impact outcomes. One can note that the overall level 
of incidents over the five years has been low and fluctuations year on year are 
inconclusive.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper is to assess economic regulation of naturally monopolistic 
network utility sector using railway infrastructure management in Estonia as a case study. 
Any regulation must be evaluated relative to its objectives. Therefore, in order to identify 
the objectives of economic regulation of railway infrastructure management, the authors 
analysed railway legislation, policy and strategy documents, and practical 
implementation of economic regulation in Estonia. The study reveals that although the 
framework of economic regulation of railway infrastructure management has been in 
place since 2004 and has not changed much over the years, there is no institutionalised 
mechanism in place to monitor how the regulation works. Objectives of economic 
regulation of railway infrastructure management in Estonia are difficult to identify and 
are mostly conceptual or vague. Cost discipline, safety, network capacity and quality of 
service are stated in a number of policy documents over the years but absence of clear 
targets does not allow the measurement and assessment of outcomes of the regulation.  
 
It was only in 2016, when specific objectives and targets of economic regulation were 
introduced in railway infrastructure financing contracts between the MoEAC and Eesti 
Raudtee with 8 areas identified as priorities. This paper allocates these objectives into 
technical-organisational, economic and health-safety-environmental categories, and 
proposes indicators to monitor performance against targets for the five year period 2013-
2017. Analysis demonstrates that most of the regulatory objectives address safety and 
quality of railway infrastructure, there is one objective on economic performance and one 
on safety performance. Currently no objectives or targets have been set on the volume of 
operations, customer satisfaction and environmental safety of railway infrastructure 
management.  
 
Technical indicators monitor the extent of speed restrictions on the infrastructure, 
network capacity and number of breakdowns that affect train schedule. All targets have 
been achieved by Eesti Raudtee and it is noted that the quality indicators have been 
improving. However, the relevance of setting targets for maximum network capacity is 
questionable because only a fraction of available capacity is utilized on Eesti Raudtee 
infrastructure.   
Economic viability of railway infrastructure management and reducing costs for 
customers is an important consideration of economic regulation in railway policy 
documents. Clear objectives are still few and targets for total expenditure rather 
unambitious. The authors propose indicators for safety and volume of operations on 
infrastructure, whilst noting that the cost efficiency of infrastructure management has 
deteriorated over the last five years.  
 
Finally, the authors highlight the need for further research towards a more holistic 
approach to measuring the effectiveness of economic regulation of railway infrastructure 
management in Estonia. A more comprehensive mechanism of objectives, targets and 
 indicators is needed to achieve this. The approach should be agile and responsive to 
industry developments, cover all important aspects of the economic activity and enable 
benchmarking railway infrastructure managers and network utilities from other sectors. 
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